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  1I. Introduction 
  Patenting of innovations from several types of biotechnology research has led to much 
debate among scientists and policy makers on the appropriate role of such intellectual 
property protection. These debates particularly focus on platform technologies, which are 
defined as specific technical developments that can be applied to various research areas and 
which could potentially give rise to multiple and diverse set of innovations. Platform 
technologies include transformation methods to introduce foreign gene constructs into 
unrelated organisms, and the sequencing and mapping of genomes that will help researchers 
identify location and the functions of those genes. The defining attribute of platform 
technologies is that whereas they have generally no direct commercial value to end users, 
they are often a critical input to developing such products. 
Considerable concern has been expressed by biotech scientists, legal scholars and 
academics that the patenting of platform technologies and research tools may encumber 
downstream research. Eisenberg (2000a) and Eisenberg and Heller (2000) fear that excessive 
patenting upstream would result in increased transaction costs for downstream innovators, 
stifling efficient research activities. In particular, there is great unease about “reach-through” 
provisions, which give patent holders of platform technologies the ability to extract rents 
from downstream innovators. Reach-through provisions would not only increase costs for 
sequential innovators, but would also increase incentives for upstream innovators diverting 
scarce research resources.  In addition there exist a real possibility that upstream innovators 
might simply block the commercialization of some downstream technologies. 
  Compounding these issues is the legal and ethical matter of whether private agents 
should be permitted to patent or license innovations that build on years of research by the 
public sector and then withhold them from other public and private research institutes. The 
public sector’s approach to research activities comes from a longstanding tradition of open 
science, which calls for free flow of new knowledge in the public realm. This spirit of sharing 
public knowledge will be eroded if patents on innovations that build on public knowledge are 
used to ultimately prevent the sharing of the knowledge. 
  This paper examines the role of patents in inducing and constraining biotech research 
by way of two in-depth case studies of platform technologies namely plant transformation 
techniques and the mapping of the rice genome. Both these platform technologies are 
important for improving the major field crops and are at the center of the debates about the 
role of patenting in biotechnology. Our first objective in conducting these two case studies is 
to understand the role of patents and the public sector in the development of these 
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sectors, a historical analysis to examine how research has evolved in these areas and key 
interviews with researchers active in the field. Our second objective is to identify some of the 
benefits and cost of patenting of platform technologies. The benefits include more rapid 
development of new platform technologies while the costs are the negative impacts on 
downstream research activities in both public and private sectors. Specifically, we search for 
evidence of hold-ups of technologies that slow the pace of downstream research and reduce 
efficiency. Our third objective is draw lessons from these case studies about what the public 
sector might do to reduce the negative consequences of patents.  
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a conceptual framework for 
analyzing instances that lead to hold-ups and strategies that could be used to circumvent 
them. Section 3 contains the transformation case study.  Section 4 presents the case of rice 
genome mapping. Section 5 attempts to draw some common lessons from both case studies 
and discusses ways in which we develop some quantitative analysis of these issues.  
 
2. Conceptual Framework 
Patents are a government intervention that can help provide incentives to research by 
“privatizing” the public goods aspect of innovations by sanctioning monopoly rights of an 
innovation to the inventor for a limited period of time. In exchange, the inventor is required 
to reveal all information related to the innovation so that other researchers can build on the 
disclosed knowledge. In effect, patents provide the necessary incentive to conduct research 
and disclose new knowledge, but at the social cost of limiting the widespread utilization of 
the innovation during the life of the patent. 
  At issue is how large the social costs are and whether effective mechanisms exist for 
efficient bargaining between the suppliers of inventions and its consumers. This in turn 
depends on the nature of the technology and the number of follow on users of the innovation. 
Consider, for example, the stylized view of sequential innovations as shown in figure 1. The 
development of a significant commercial technology (C) may require intermediate 
technologies (denoted BB1
B to BB
                                                
n
B), either collectively or individually. These intermediate 
technologies may themselves be due to a key precipitating technology (denoted A)TPF
1
FPT. If both 
A and B are patented (or patentable), then of interest is the impact A will have on the 




PT Technology A itself builds on prior knowledge and technologies as indicated by the arrows left of A. 
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patent A, technology B, and thereby any subsequent commercial possibilities, may not occur. 
Second, a less extreme variation of this possibility would have A reducing developmental cost 
of B, without necessarily preventing the development of B.  In either case it is clear that A 
confers upon B (and thereby the commercial technology) some benefits that may not be 
realized without its absence. A correct evaluation of the value of A would there have to 
account for any direct commercial value of A plus the indirect benefits that result from B due 
to A. If A is indispensable in the creation of B then a relatively large share of indirect benefits 
will go to the owners of A. On the other hand if A simply reduces the production cost of B, 
then the benefits would be relatively small.  
 If  A has no commercial value as a stand alone technology, but is valuable to only a 
small set of B technology owners then it is easy to see the circumstances under which holdups 
occur. First, in the presence of patents, the patent holder of A by exercising her monopoly 
position may extract rents from the owners of B and possibly C. Given the uncertain nature of 
technology development (risk, asymmetric information) efficient bargaining may not be 
possible. Technology owner A could therefore threaten to hold up the development of B 
unless it receives a large share of the benefits. If the claims of the A technology patent are 
sufficiently broad, then a greater number of downstream innovators will be affected from 
such hold-ups. 
  Second, in the absence of patents, it is unclear whether A would even be developed. 
The development of A might require large R&D investments that can only be recovered if 
profits can be appropriated through patents. Without patents or any other type of government 
intervention, such as R&D subsidies, A may never come into existence. If A is critical in B’s 
development then the absence of patents creates a more serious type of holdup as there is no 
possibility of any bargaining if A simply does not exist. 
  How might holdups due to a patent monopoly on a platform technology be 
circumvented? One possibility would be where the development of B technology depends on 
not just one A, but multiple As as illustrated in figure 2. Here, intermediate technology 
holders could source any of the holders of A technology to develop the commercial product 
as the market for A technology would be competitive. For this to occur, one must assume that 
there exist several technology As that are broadly substitutable. Technological limitations and 
small markets are just two reasons that might preclude such possibility.  
  Government policy towards R&D that encourages several pathways of technology 
development would limit holdups. These policy instruments such as R&D grants and 
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the necessary incentive and push for technology development. Whatever policy is employed, 
it is clear that a balance needs to be sought that results in technology generation [i.e. the 
creation of A] while providing a sufficiently competitive environment that does not cause the 
monopolization of key platform technologies. 
  The sequential schema presented above is admittedly a very simple characterization 
of technology development. The more realistic case is one where new commercial technology 
is a consequence of the convergence of several pathways as illustrated in figure 3. Here 
different precursor technologies (A technologies) lead to the development of B technology 
which ultimately results in a commercial technology. A classic and contemporary example is 
the case of vitamin A rice which required negotiating licenses on 70 patents originally held 
by about 30 institutions. If all the different platform technologies represented by the As are 
required for the development of B, then the hold up problem is further amplified and more 
severe.  
We next seek to explore, by way of our case studies, whether holdups have occurred 
in practice and, if so, how researchers have overcome the constraint. For each case study we 
begin first by giving a brief historical overview of the technology to assess the role the public 
sector has contributed.  Second, based on our preliminary interviews and available literature, 
we identify some of the key patents in this area.  Then we assess the impact of patents and 
public sector research on developments of the platform technology and finally identify hold-
ups due to patenting.  
 
3. Transformation  Case  Study 
3.1 History  
Most of the transformation technology came out of research conducted at public 
sector labs. The major private biotech firms also contributed to the development of these 
techniques and now own or have exclusive licenses to all of the major technologies. The main 
techniques of transforming plants are listed along with institution where they were developed 
and the current owners of the technology in Table 1. Scientists have performed controlled 
plant transformation with specific genes since the mid-1970s. One of the most common 
methods for introduction of DNA into plant cells uses latent Agrobacterium tumefaciens—
bacteria in which the DNA of interest has replaced the disease genes. Another transformation 
method known as particle bombardment or biolistics uses rapidly propelled tungsten 
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cells and the DNA of interest is often incorporated at random into the plant DNA.  
 
The research to produce the first transformed plant and particularly the first 
transformed plants of important commercial crops had all the aspects of a classic research 
race. The genetic transformation of plants was first achieved in the early 1980s by four 
groups working independently at Washington University in St. Louis, Missouri, the 
Rijksuniversiteit in Ghent, Belgium, the Monsanto Company in St. Louis, Missouri, and and 
the University of Wisconsin. The university based groups were primarily funded by public 
sources, although the researchers at Washington University and the Rijksuniversiteit also 
worked as  consultants for Monsanto.  Most initial successful transformations were limited to 
tobacco, although a  Wisconsin group had successfully inserted a bean gene into sunflower.  
During the 1980s the plants that could be transformed using the Agrobacterium method was 
increased to include most dicots such as cotton in 1987 and soybeans in 1988.  
The second major category of transformation techniques uses some type of particle 
gun. The problem was that agrobacterium did not work will in corn and soybeans and so 
another transformation method was needed.  The use of a particle gun for plant 
transformation was also developed in the early 1980s. The projectile gun, called the  Helium 
Biorad particle gun, was developed at Cornell University by John Sanford funded by the 
Cornell Biotechnology Institute in the 1980s.  The first published report of using 
microprojectiles to transform living cells was in 1987. The first transgenic plants produced 
using this method was tobacco in 1988 followed by corn in 1990 (Goldberg 1995). The 
electric discharge particle gun was developed in the late 1980s by Dennis McCabe, Paul 
Christou, and colleagues at Agracetus. Agracetus published an article describing the 
transformation of soybeans in 1988.  
Agrobacterium was not successfully used on monocots until the 1990s. As such, 
initial successful transformations of grain crops used the polyethylene glycol (PEG) induced 
DNA uptake, the electroporation and the microprojectile bombardment-mediated (biolistic) 
gene transfer method. The majority of the successful transformation of grain crops  that have 
been reported have been due to the biolistic method. Transformation methods based on the 
use of Agrobacterium are  preferred in many instances because of the following properties: (i) 
they are easy to handle, (ii) they have a higher efficiency, and (iii) there is a more predictable 
pattern of foreign DNA integration (Ignacmuthu et al., 2000). The U. of Washington, Seattle 
was the first to show transformation of rice cells with Agrobacterium in a callus but they did 
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Washington lab took a job at Japan Tobacco Industries and developed the technique 
improving the efficiency of transformation and producing transformed rice plants.  
 
 
3. 2 Patenting of Transformation Technologies 
  One can think of three types of patents that are important for plant transformation.  
The first, most obvious type is a patent on the transformation system itself e.g. the 
agrobacterium mediated system or the biolistic gun.  The second type of patent is on the all of  
the components of the system that make the transformation possible – anti-biotic resistance 
genes for selecting transformed e coli,  promoter genes that make the added gene work 
effectively in the plant, etc. Third, there are patents on the use of  these transformation 
systems or on novel in specific crops or classes of crops.   
  The public and private groups working on agrobacterium transformation that were 
mentioned above all applied for and received patents on their methods.  Patents on one 
Agrobacterium  transformation method was applied for by the Max Planck Institute in 1983 
and by Monsanto in the same year. In the U.S. these patent applications are still in 
interference proceedings almost twenty years later.  The Washington University group 
applied for a  patent on the transformation of dicots with an Agrobacterium vector (US 
6,051,757) in 1983, but was issued to Washington University in 2000, almost 17 years after it 
was applied for. It is not clear whether this was by accident or design, but it is clearly more 
valuable now that it would have been in 1983.  Japan Tobacco holds the patent on using 
Agrobacterium to transform  monocots (US5591616), Cornell holds the patent on the Helium 
Biorad particle (US 4,945,050), and the patent for the electric discharge particle gun is held 
by Agracetus. 
  Table 2 provides a detailed inventory of all patents issued and related to the 
agrobacterium-mediated transformation of plants. This shows some of the patents on the 
complementary inputs that are needed  to produced transformed plants. Since the success of 
plant transformation depends very much on promoter sequences, a large number of promoters 
have been used in transformation. The promoter CaMV 35S and its derivatives have been 
used extensively. Like the different transformation techniques, the gene expression efficiency 
of a promoter varies for different plants and different parts of the plant.  Two of the patents 
for which there seem to be few alternatives are the kanamycin marker gene (the alternatives 
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Washington U. and monocots by Japan Tobacco.  
  Researchers wishing to transform plants not only have to seek permission from the 
owner of the patents on the transformation methods but also have to contend with the 
multitudes of patents on the promoter and marker genes as well as patents on the actual gene 
of interest that is being introduced in to the plant (for example a Bt gene or a herbicide 
tolerant gene). Compounding this further is the fact that a novel plant variety may also be 
patent protected. One well publicized example  of such  a “patent thicket” is in the research 
on beta-carotene enhanced rice (“golden rice”). Kryder, Kowalski and Krattiger (2000) report 
that the golden rice innovation involves using as many as 70 pieces of intellectual property 
and 15 pieces of technical property spread over 31 institution.  
  While the public sector is credited for developing some of the key transformation 
techniques, almost two-thirds of the gene transformation patents are held by private entities. 
Figure 1, shows patents issued in the class that predominantly cover transformation methods 
by application dateTPF
2
FPT. The first patent to be classified under this class was in 1978, but not 
until 1983 did sustained patenting begin to occur. 
 
3.3. Impact of Patents on Progress in Transformation Technology   
The impact of awarding patents on transformation technologies will be different for 
private and public researchers. From the perspective of a profit maximizing private 
researcher, the incentive to patent plant transformation technologies will be due to the 
appropriability that the patents provide and by the disclosure made by other patents. Not only 
will the owner of a patent make money on licensing, but she may also be able to keep others 
from working on products that will compete with her products. American Cyanamid could 
not get access to the biolistic gun from Cornell gun which was licensed to DuPont because 
DuPont and Cyanamid both wanted to use it to create competing transgenic crops.  
Competitors who fear being left out or cannot gain access to a technology will attempt to 
invent alternative techniques. The information in the patents and the cost of licensing these 
technologies may stimulate competitors to try to develop new methods of transformation or 
to increase the efficiency of older methods. Private research firms would still have an 
incentive to do research on transformation even if they could not patent the transformation 
process.  
                                                 
TP
2
PT In the U.S. patent system, most transformation technologies fall under the class and subclasses of 935/052: 
“Methods of introducting a gene into a host cell” 
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expected profits is less than for private firms because public institutions have other goals in 
addition to generating licensing revenues. Moreover, the incentives for inventing around the 
inventions were less because universities can usually get access to the technologies for 
research purposes without too much difficulty. Now that universities are finding that they do 
not have freedom to commercialize genetically modified varieties that were produced using 
patented processes, they once again have a strong incentive to develop new methods of 
transformation.  
  The major problem for universities in most cases is not for obtaining access to a 
transformation technique for research use, but it is freedom to commercialize.  If companies 
do not have this freedom, then they may avoid a commodity or an area of research (in one 
interview we were told that DuPont avoids tomatoes because of Calgene/Monsanto patents).   
  The result of these different policies and motivations has been continuous progress in 
transformation technology, which has dramatically increased the efficiency and reduced the 
cost of transforming plants. The patent holders and their collaborators have increased the 
efficiency of each technique, they have extended the most efficient techniques to new plants, 
and they have developed some new techniques.  
  Since 1990 the most important increases in efficiency have been from the first two 
methods – increasing the efficiency of  techniques and moving them to new crops or classes 
of plants.  In the mid 1990s the biolistic gun was the only transformation process that could 
be used for transforming grains.  It was very inefficient process.  The last column of Table 1 
shows the differences in efficiency at present.  It indicates that Japan Tobacco’s achievement 
at transforming grain with agrobacterium greatly increases the grain transformation 
efficiency.  This method of using agrobacterium to transform monocots led to a drop in the 
cost of transforming grain crops for several reasons: first, there is no need for the machinery, 
the gun; second, you do not have to shoot and reload the gun while with agrobacterium you 
can do hundreds of transformations simultaneously, making it more effective for high 
through put screening; third, the probability of transformation is greatly increased and fourth, 
there is a ‘cleaner’ pattern of DNA integration with agrobacterium which reduces the cost of 
biosafety regulation.  
 
3.4.  Impact of Patents on Biotechnology Research Investments and Productivity 
  Private research investments in transformation research appears to be negatively 
related to the cost of doing downstream research. Patented technology such as agrobacterium 
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probably increased productivity of research even more.  Presumably this is why so many 
companies invested in using these techniques, although it is possible that they greatly 
overestimated the increase in research productivity that they have gotten so far from these 
technologies. These patents may also reduce the cost of doing research for the patent holder 
since he gets money from other firms for the use of the patented technology (but not if he is 
spending a lot on legal fees to defend the patent). 
     Cyanamid was slowed in their attempt to make herbicide tolerant maize and rice by 
Cornell’s exclusive licensing of the gun to DuPont.   They were not able to negotiate a deal 
with DuPont to use the biolistic gun which was their main rival in one type of herbicide 
production.  Thus, it took them several more years to produce herbicide tolerant crops than it 
would have.  
  Our interviews suggest that a problem for companies using some transformation 
technologies is that nobody knows who owns them in the U.S. It could be one of their main 
competitors and that competitor could then block the use of varieties developed using that 
method unless large royalties were paid.  For example, there is an interference proceeding in 
the U.S. that has been going on for 18 years with at least 4 parties that claim agrobacterium 
methods – the Max Planck Group, the Mogen/Zeneca group, the Washington U. group, and 
Monsanto. For this reason Dow does not use agrobacterium in its transformation work. Dow 
chose to use the whisker technique which is a less efficient method because of the mess with 
establishing priority on agrobacterium transformation methods.  
  Patents on transformation technologies and fact that Japanese companies did not start 
doing  biotech research until 1983 were the two major reasons that Japanese companies got 
out of biotech (Shimamoto 2001).  They had their own transformation techniques (PEG 
mediated) but they needed the promoters and the marker genes.  They negotiated with 
Monsanto and others but could not reach anything that seemed like a reasonable deal – they 
felt that no matter how much the offered, Monsanto and other companies would have refused.    
  The other major hold up that we have identified so far was Liberty Link (Basta 
herbicide resistant) corn and maybe soybeans. Agrevo (now Bayer) bought PGS which was 
doing research on corn that was resistance to Agrevo’s herbicide, Basta,  and understood that 
the Basta resistance gene was public. Agrevo did 3 or 4 years of research to develop Basta 
(the commercial name is Liberty)  resistant corn. They knew that DeKalb had applied for a 
patent, but thought it was on basta resistant corn using projectile transformation technique. So 
they used another transformation technique (protoplast fusion).  They worked with Holden’s 
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produce enough foundation seed to produce up to a million acres of Liberty Link  
  However, DeKalb had applied for a patent on all Basta resistant corn. DeKalb’s patent 
on BAR corn was approved for any type of transformation process. DeKalb hired a firm to go 
around to all of Holden’s customers.  They said pay $12/bag or see us in court.  Holden’s 
could have fought it, but  they told the seed companies that they would have to get licenses 
from DeKalb and from Agrevo. This was impossible because Agrevo had decided to fight 
DeKalb over this patent.  This effectively killed Liberty link maize.  Agrevo is continuing to 
fight in court and may win.  DeKalb’s patent may not meet the non-obviousness requirement.  
But Agrevo will have lost the war to RR corn.  
  Another major cost of the patenting system is in law suits. One such suit was just filed 
on July 25, 2002 in Delaware.  Syngenta claims that Monsanto and Delta and Pine Land 
infringed on their patents on Agrobacterium to transform dicots such as cotton and soybeans.  
The believe that Monsanto should start paying them royalties on their Bollguard and 
Yieldgard, and Roundup Ready crops or stop selling them (Syngenta 2002). This is likely to 
be major, long battle.  Which will be great for lawyers but expensive for both companies.  
 
4. Rice Genome Research 
The determination of the genome sequences of many organisms from bacteria to fruit 
flies, crops, and humans is a watershed event in biology. Since the first completed sequencing 
of an autonomous living organism in 1995, there have been nearly 221 more organisms that 
been sequenced and the results published, with another 961 projects that are ongoing (GOLD, 
2004). Perhaps the most important and widely publicized was the sequencing of the human 
genome in 2000, a project that took nearly ten years to complete and cost $3 billion dollars 
(Collins et al, 2003). In agriculture, rice was the first commercially important crop to have its 
genome sequenced in 2001. Sequencing the genome, although an important step, may 
however be the easy part in the ultimate goal of understanding gene function and turning that 
information into economic and social gains.   
The issue of claiming property rights over certain genetic sequences has been contentious, 
if not the most publicized, aspects of genomics research. Controversy in intellectual property 
protection results in uncertainty, which in turn creates distorted incentives, higher transaction 
costs and a sub-optimal level of investment in R&D (Long, 1999). This has been particularly 
true for the case of expressed sequence tags (ESTs) which are short DNA sequences but 
whose biological function may be undetermined at the time of the discovery.  Proponents of 
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unknown, a patent should be granted as at some later time the discovery of the function may 
become known. Since patent law prevents the patenting of innovations that are in the public 
domain for more than a year, by not granting patents on such sequences private firms may be 
less willing to undertake further research (Long, 1999). On the other hand, those opposed to 
patenting of sequences have argued that it would result in wasteful research as firms rush to 
patent ESTs of dubious significance. Interestingly, opponents of patenting gene sequence also 
suggest that firm’s will have a disincentive to undertake further research if they have already 
obtained a patent on the actual gene. Needless to say, the uncertainty created during much of 
the 90’s regarding ESTs may have held up new research which prompts Long (1999) to 
suggest that “at some point an imperfect solution, expeditiously reached, becomes preferable 
to a perfect solution that takes a long time to reach.” 
There are a number of reasons why the study of rice genomics as a case study for IP 
issues is relevant. First, rice was one of the first commercially important crops that had its 
genome sequenced. As such, any IP issues that were specific to genomics research would 
have arose during the course of the sequencing effort. Second, due to its close genetic 
relatedness to other complex, but more commercially lucrative, crops there was considerable 
research that was conducted by private sector firms. The behavior of the private sector and 
how it uses intellectual property not only to protect its discoveries, but in the research process 
as well, will be instructive. In this regard we are also interested in exploring the role public 
sector technology has had on the sequencing efforts of the private sector and vice versa. By 
cataloging the key IP related developments of genomics research we pose some 
counterfactuals and ask whether the technological development would have occurred at the 
same pace as the one observed.  
The balance of this section is organized as follows. In the next (sub)section we seek to 
trace the development of research in sequencing the rice genome in an effort to understand 
the role played by different public and private researchers. Specifically we ask whether, and 
to what extent, the proprietary technology used in DNA sequencing, was a source of hold-up 
for firms either through unreasonable licensing terms (high fees, reach-through provisions, 
etc) or simply withholding of sequencing of technology from potential users. Next we explore 
the reasons for the rapid increase in sequencing that has taken place between 1999 onwards 
and whether the incentive mechanism of patents was a reason. The motivation behind 
Monsanto’s and Syngenta’s to effectively donate their sequence database is also examined.  
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4.2 History  
Sequencing of the rice genome began in earnest in the late 1990’s, but much of the 
ground work was laid in the two decades preceding it, when a series of methods used in 
determining the sequence of base pairs ultimately led to effort behind the different genome 
projects. As was the case with the human genome project, the rice genome project got its start 
within the public and nonprofit sector. In the late 80’s the USDA funded the Plant Genome 
Project to develop genetic maps for more than 50 crops (McCouch, 1998). Maps were used to 
localize genes and quantitative trait loci (QTLs) and used in plant breeding activities. Starting 
in the late 80’s Rockefeller funded rice mapping research at institutes in developed and 
developing countries and Cornell University served as headquarters of the gene mapping 
project.  In 1991 the Japanese government started a large project ($5 million + per year) to 
map the rice genome 
It was initially assumed that a map had to be developed for each crop as mapping was 
considered commodity specific (McCouch, 1998). This thinking changed as molecular 
linkage data suggested an entire plant family could be studied as a single genetic system and 
the most extensive accumulation of data supporting this concept has been for the grass 
familyTPF
3
FPT. It was observed that the one could arrange the chromosome of various species in 
concentric circles such that a radial line from the central species with the smallest genome 
would pass through regions of similar genetic content of other speicies (Phillips and Freeling, 
1998). For the case the grass family, rice had the smallest genome and later would become a 
natural candidate to have its genome extensively studied and sequenced.TPF
4
FPT .   
 In the late 90’s there was a further realization by the public sector researchers that 
many of the molecular genetic and bioinformatics tools developed as part of the Human, 
Arabidopsis, and Drosophila Genome Projects, could be directly be adopted or provide 
guidance to meet plant specific needs. As with these other genome projects, the expectation 
was that sequencing of a plant genome would allow one to identify all useful gene that in turn 
would be invaluable to plant breeders interested in introducing novel genes and traits via 
biotechnology.  
 
                                                 
TP
3
PT The grass family consists of five principal subfamilies and about 10,000 diverse species, including important 




PT McCouch (1998) reports that initially the USDA sponsored Plant Genome Initiative were focused on applying 
genomic research to the study of maize due to its commercial importance. 
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sequencing of rice the International Rice Genome Sequencing Project (IRGSP) led by 
Japanese government researchers was launched. Initially IRGSP was a 10 year $200 million 
project which consisted of research institutes spanning 10 countries in Asia, Europe and the 
Americas. These groups divided up the genome of a japonica rice variety name Nipponbarre 
and aimed to have 40 percent of the genome sequence by 2003 and the whole genome 
sequenced by 2008 (Saegusa, 1999).. Budgets were increases with the Japanese government 
committing $20 million a year for sequencing and another $28 million a year for functional 
genomics, building a cDNA library and DNA marker research. Rice sequencing research 
obtained $12.5 million from the U.S. government starting in 1999.   
  At the same time parallel efforts were going on in the private sector.  Monsanto, 
Syngenta, and others were funding their own proprietary rice maps. Celera offered to 
completely map the rice genome for $30 million, but no one took them up on the offer.  
Monsanto had its map constructed by the U. of Washington, Seattle in the laboratory of Dr. 
Leroy Hood under contract for Monsanto. They used the same basic approach (mapping the 
genome piece by piece from identified locations on a physical or genetic map) and mapped 
the same genome as  the public sector project.  Syngenta worked with Myriad Genetics and 
the Clemson University Genomics Institute.(Syngenta 2001).  
On April 5, 2000 Monsanto announced that it had produced a map of the rice genome 
that was nearly complete and was making its map and its collection of BACs available to the 
MAFF Rice Genome Project. On January 26, 2001 Syngenta and its partner Myriad Genetics 
announced that they had completed the sequencing of the rice genome. In April 2002 
Syngenta and the Beijing Genetics Institute both published drafts of rice genomes in Science. 
The cost of the Syngenta project was $30 to 50 million (Shantaram personal communication 
2002). They used Myriad’s proprietary DNA sequencing technology.  Syngenta says that it 
will make most of  the information that they have discovered available to legitimate scientists 
working on the problems of the poor, but that they hoped to make money from this project by 
selling information from their database to other biotech and seed firms.  
The Beijing Genomics Institute, a Chinese public research group, announced 
completion of the sequencing of the genome of an Indica   hybrid rice cultivar in 2001 (China 
Daily 2001).  In January 2002 the group announced that it was making all of the information 
publicly available.  They used the whole-genome shotgun approach and covered at least 95% 
of the genome.  The public international rice genome project which used the slower but more 
complete piece  by piece sequencing method completed its sequencing effort in December 
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discovered.  
  Competition between the public sector and the private sector clearly accelerated the 
research and disclosure of the components of the rice genome. Celera’s 1999 offer to 
sequence the entire rice genome was a wake-up call the Japanese government which 
substantially boosted their investment in rice sequencing in 1998.   The announcements by 
Monsanto in 2000 and Syngenta in 2001 that they had draft maps of the rice genome were a 
further stimulus to Japanese government spending.  Monsanto’s provision their BAC library 
and map to the IRSGP increased the productivity of the public research program (Normile in 
Science 2002).   Monsanto disclosure of their data and then word that the BGI was about to 
publish their draft of the indica genome appears to have induced Syngenta to publish their 
findings in Science and make their genomes available to the IRGSP in the Spring of 2002.  
These developments in turn have stimulated IRGSP to announce that they will publish their 
draft sequence which is more complete that any of the others by December 2002. 
 
4.3 The Public and the Private in Genome Sequencing and Role of IPRs 
The historical overview of the race to sequence the rice genome provides us a basis to 
discuss the incentives behind the sequencing efforts of the private and public sectors. In 
particular we ask to what extent patents spurred innovative behavior and whether they, in any 
way, may have hindered the sequencing effort. It is interesting to note that the long list of 
citations to the technical antecedents of the genome project, some tools have been patented 
whereas others have not. Consider the sequencing techniques that were developed by Sanger 
or Maxam or Gilbert which were never patented but, as suggested by Cook-Deegan (1994), 
were surely patentable. These sequencing techniques are central to today’s automated 
genomic research. Some of the earliest molecular markers used extensively in mapping such 
as RFLPs were also developed in the public sector but also never patented.   
Although many of the fundamental technologies used in genomics research are not 
patented, patents do exists on enzymes, sequencing machinery (computers, biochips, robots, 
etc), and software. Lab instruments such as DNA sequencers and DNA synthesizers are sold 
with the price of the instrument and its reagents covering patent fees. The issue, of course, is 
not so much whether a technology is simply patented but they way it is disseminated so that 
other researchers could put it to more productive use. The contrasting cases of the PCR patent 
and the Cohen-Boyer patent is instructive. The patent on polymerase chain reaction, 
discovered by Cetus in 1983, was controlled through a complex arrangement of high-fee 
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the most important techniques in molecular biology, the Cohen-Boyer process for 
recombinant DNA, was also patented but licensed at relatively low fees. These different ways 
of handling the dissemination of research tools obviously affected who could use them, and 
perhaps the pace of innovation.  
Private investments induced in part by patents have, however, made an enormous 
contribution to the research process.  Sequencing equipment and the microchip arrays were 
based on ideas developed at Universities and are now advancing rapidly in the private sector 
which is driven by patents and pulled by the demand from the human genome project and 
medical research.  
Did patents hinder the sequencing effort? Perhaps the strongest evidence against hold-
ups at the level of DNA sequencing is the extremely competitive nature of sequencing race 
that occurred. This competition not only speeded up the sequencing effort of the rice 
genome—moving the completion date of the public sector project nearly six years early—but 
spread the technology so much that it is now almost routine as evidenced by the fact that 
nearly 1000 genome projects are underway.  Over the course of a decade the productivity of 
the sequencing technology has improved exponentially. Figure 4 (from Carlson, 2003), 
estimates the potential daily productivity of DNA sequencing based on three commercially 
available machines as of 2002, namely those manufactured by Applied Biosytems (subsidiary 
of Applera Corporation), Egea Biosciences (acquired by Johnson and Johnson) and 
Pyrosequencing AB (now Biotage). The productivity of the most widely used synthesizer—
the ABI Synthesizer—has increased from 
5 81 0 x bases sequenced per person per day in 1994 
to 
7 31 0 x in 2002. These estimates include the time required for pre-processing and sample 
handling on each instrument but does not include the time required for sequence analysis.  
The cost of sequencing has also decreased substantially (figure 5). For the period 
covered by figure 2, the cost of sequencing (expendables such as reagents) have fallen 
exponentially. Lander et al (2001) estimate that the cost of sequencing had fallen by a factor 
of 100 in ten years by 2000 and that costs have been falling by a factor of 2 every eighteen 
months. Shifts to new technologies and increased capability at lower cost will ensure that 
these trends will likely continue. A major cost saving is due to automation, which means that 
labor is only required to load the samples on the machines, a task that could be done by a 
technician. The pace at which productivity increased is why companies like Celera were able 
to claim that they could sequence the rice genome in 18 months for $30 million. Leaders of 
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from Applied Biosystems in 2000 increased the speed of their sequencing process by 5 times 
over machinery that they had bought 5 years earlier (Personal communication - Higo 
November 2001). 
  It is also noteworthy that the public sector sequencing effort of the rice genomes has 
greatly benefited from the draft sequences produced by Monsanto and Syngenta (IRGSP, 
2002). When Monsanto produced its draft sequence of the rice independent of the IRGSP 
effort, it made its BAC clones available to the public sector effort. By combining the 
Monsanto BAC clone data with the data that was being generated, the IRGSP was able to 
generate a high quality sequence data which also helped accelerate its sequencing effort. 
Syngenta’s decision to provide its draft sequence to IRGSP in 2002 also was useful as it 
extended the PAC/BAC contigs and thereby extending the gaps in the physical map (IRGSP, 
2002).  
One, however, should be mindful that initial release of the Monsanto and Syngenta 
data were greeted by many with skepticism and even controversy. When Syngenta published 
its results of the rice genome in the journal Science in 2001, it did not release the data to 
GenBank which was the norm. Rather, the data was put up on Syngenta’s website and access 
was restricted to academic researchers, who supposedly ceded any commercial applications 
of their research to Syngenta (Butler, 2002). Monsanto’s data too when first released in 2000 
was accessible only when researchers agreed to certain conditions. Many researchers were 
weary of signing up to these databases as they felt that the withholding of such information is 
contrary to the conduct of scientific inquiry. Moreover the demand for access for such data 
was low, considering the Beijing Genomic Sciences had released its data to GenBank and 
that IRGSP would have make available its data once sequenced. It has been reported that 
after the initial announcement by BGI and Syngenta, 350 researchers accessed the BCI data 
on GenBank and only 65 used the Syngenta data (BGI, 2001). Clearly the low demand for 
their proprietary contributed to Syngenta’s decision to donate the rice data to IRGSP. It is, of 
course, unclear whether any data has been held back.   
  The rice genome sequencing effort was therefore a rather unique research process 
where the roles of the public and private sectors clearly departed from the traditional linear 
research paradigm of basic-applied-developmental research. Although many of the intial 
techniques involved in sequencing were developed by the public sector, and later perfected 
and commercialized the by private both public and private actively engaged in competitive 
behavior followed by collaborative effort. There is little evidence to suggest that there were 
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been rapidly decreasing, making sequencing technology accessible and widespread and 2) 
there was sharing of sequence data that helped the public sector meet its goal quickly 
 
IPRs Post-Sequencing Stage  
The issue of IPRs however is likely to be controversial in the “post sequencing” stage, 
especially in the matter of finding genes of interest and structural genomics. It is estimated 
that rice has 60,000 genes, but for only half of these has some gene function been assigned, 
but not definatively (Cyranoski, 2003). It is for only 100 rice genes has an accurate, 
demonstrated function been determined. Researchers reported that the availability of gene 
maps of the rice genome will lead to an enormous increase in the efficiency of research that is 
developing improved rice varieties and improved varieties of other grains (Ronald and Leung 
2002).   Research that used to take years to do can now be done in minutes – for example 
finding out whether a gene that has been identified in corn also exists in rice 
In many ways a second stage race to identify the function of thousands of genes has 
begun, having much greater economic and agronomic significance.  In contrast to the race to 
sequence the rice genome, which was largely done collaboratively with the sharing of data, 
the functional genomics research is likely going to be less collaborative as researchers would 
want to lay proprietary claim to 1) any tools used in gene identification, 2) actual genes 
coding for specific protein, or 3) protein structures that are discovered and developed. We 
discuss, in turn, the nature of these three “research tools” and the IPR issues surrounding 
them.  
  There are several approaches in identifying gene function. First, large libraries of 
mutant plants can be created that have within their genome randomly inserted bits of tagged 
DNA that disrupt or promote nearby gene. By observing which traits are expressed relative to 
normal non-mutant plants, gene function can be assigned. Researchers in Japan and South 
Korea have creater mutant libraries that are as large as 100,000 mutants (Cyranoski, 2003). A 
second approach is to knock out genes specific genes and thereby disrupting the function of 
particular gene. A tool developed by Shiger Iida uses the knock out approach and exploits the 
occasional tendency of DNA to insert itself into at points where the sequence matches its 
own—known as homologous recombination (Cyranoski, 2003). Lastly, DNA microarrays 
have also been employed in identifying gene function. Microarracys--which consist of 
thousand of known genes--allow for rapid screening of a plant’s genetic make-up or gene 
function. Microarrays are useful in that they reveal a network of genes, which are difficult to 
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developed by Syngenta has been used to identify the 269 genes that expressed in the 
development of a rice grain (Cyranoski, 2003).  
  However access to the tools used in gene identification are restricted, and therein lies 
the danger of holdups. Most microarrays, such as that of Syngenta are proepriatary. The 
knock-out technology of Iida is patented. And then there is the example of Japan which is 
restricting the use of such tools to its researchers (Cyranoski, 2003). This has resulted in 
China developing its own functional genomic resources, and will likely prompt other 
countries to follow suit if they don’t want to be shut out completely. 
Although there were some patents granted early on for sequences of the genes, now 
sequences can not be patented unless there is strong evidence of the utility of the gene or 
genes that have been sequenced.  Thus, the raw output of the sequencing process can not be 
patented and the entire sequence or map of an entire genome of a plant also does not seem to 
be patentable in the U.S.  However, the computer programs to identify genes and their 
functions can be patented or copyrighted.  Some of the specialty companies that do contract 
functional genomics rely on patented software or software protected by trade secrets.  Further 
downstream, genes that can be shown to have a useful purpose can be patented if they also 
meet the novelty and nonobviousness requirements of the patent law.  Methods for finding 
and identifying these genes can also be patented. 
Some reach through requirements have been reported between the providers of inputs 
into the sequencing process and the sequencers.  In order to get access to the latest computer 
chip technology, the Japanese government had the choice of paying large lump sum payments 
to a private U.S. firm or paying much less but giving the firm some control over the rice 
technology that was developed.  However, reach throughs from platform technology to 
downstream research do not seem to be common.  Table 3 indicates that in most of the 
genomics deals for which information is available the research is being done by the owners of 
technology on a contract basis which included up front payments and benchmark payments 
by the major chemical or seed companies rather than royalties on the sale of products.  Only 
Myriad had a deal for a share of the sales of the technology and Millenium formed a joint 
venture with Monsanto called Cereon, which will share the profits of products sales.  
There are no reach through requirements between the private providers of the rice 
genomics information,  Monsanto and Syngenta,  and the public sector.  The information is 
not available to other private firms until it s modified and becomes public through through 
the Rice Genome Project.  
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At the next step down the research ladder companies that provide specific patented 
genes to seed companies for the development of transgenic varieties provide these genes in 
contracts that provide not only royalties but considerable control over how and when the 
technology is used.  
The absence or presence of these reach through or royalty agreements is partially due 
to the relative power and circumstances of the companies who are selling and buying the 
technologies. The sellers of the platform technologies were either medium to large sized 
firms that primarily supply technology to the human health or smaller start ups that 
concentrate more in agriculture.  The buyers are much larger chemical and seed companies 
who have fairly steady revenues while the small start-ups are just trying to survive and the 
more successful medical start ups are not interested in a long term involvement in agriculture.  
Sellers of genes have so far been large companies like Monsanto and DowTPF
5
FPT usually selling to 
smaller seed companies.   
  So far these genome projects have not had many obvious impacts at the farmer level. 
The Rice Genome Project in Japan is probably typical.  It is generating an immense amount 
of knowledge, but so far no useful technology.  Leaders of that project recently reported that 
there are no transgenic rice varieties planted commercially in Japan or anywhere else in the 
world. It is unlikely that there are any rice varieties in which marker aided selection MAS 
which used markers based on the RGP played a big role.  Finally, although the identification 
of genes is accelerating due to the use of map based cloning, only 15 to 16 genes have been 
identified using this technique (Higo personal communication Nov. 2001).  
 
5. Conclusions  
  This paper indicates that these two platform technologies – plant transformation 
techniques and structural genomics - required major inputs by the public sector to initiate 
their development and to continue to ensure that they made progress.  They also indicate that 
private firms played a major role in the development of these tools, although less so in the 
gene sequencing case.   
Would the private sector have made the investment that they made in the absence of 
IPRs to protect the tools or IPRs to protect plant genes?  Our reading of the evidence is that it 
is very unlikely that they would have and that this would have considerably slowed the 
                                                 
TP
5
PT The genes were often from small start-ups that spun off from university research  like Mycogen, Calgene. and 
Agrigenetics.  
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Transformation technology has already had a major impact on world agriculture through 
insect resistant cotton and corn and herbicide resistant cotton.  Structural genomics has so far 
had little measurable impact on farmers, but its potential impact through crop improvement 
that uses marker aided selection and through genetic engineering is immense.  
The price we pay for these contributions are the hold-ups and increased cost of 
research that are described in the paper.  So far these costs do not appear to have not been as 
important as the contribution of the private technologies, but we have not done an empirical 
investigation of this yet.    
In addition there is the feeling that the private sector should not be profiting 
extensively from research financed by the public sector.  This is particularly frustrating to the 
public sector when private firms or university patent offices make it difficult to get access to 
a platform technology which was originally finance and developed by the public sector .   
However, as in the medical field, if major investments are required to make the university 
technology work, patents or exclusive licenses may be necessary for the public good.  
The fact that our initial reading of the anecdotal evidence suggests that so far biotech 
patents have induced a response from the public sector that outweighs their costs does not 
mean that the situation could not be improved. Patents on plant transformation technology 
have probably  increased the production of more efficient transformation technology by 
private firms.   However, it is creating some hold ups which as yet we have not been able to 
evaluate in economic terms.  It has also helped increase the market power of a few firms – 
namely Monsanto and Syngenta – which control key patents on transformation and also the 
marker genes which have few alternatives.  
The major problem for universities and corporations in most cases is not obtaining 
access to a transformation technique for research use, but it is freedom to commercialize.  If 
companies do not have this freedom, then they may avoid a commodity or an area of research 
(in one interview we were told that DuPont avoids tomatoes because of Calgene/Monsanto 
patents) strengthening the power of the first firms in the market.   
  It appears that universities could help avoid some of these problems in several ways.  
First, by providing better information about public sector alternatives to expensive private 
technology.  This is one of the aims of the IP clearinghouse that has just been established by 
the Rockefeller and McKnight Foundations. Second, by charging flat fees for the use of their 
patented technology and not having contracts that require permission or royalties for 
commercialization on platform technologies, they would be available to more companies and 
  21they would push the price of using the techniques down.  If a few major technologies in each 
category of platform technologies are reasonably inexpensive to obtain, then monopoly 
power would be considerably reduced.  Third, new research is needed in some areas to 
overcome existing monopolies.  For example, public alternatives to Monsanto’s antibiotic 
marker gene would be very useful. One of the goals of future work in this research project is 
to evaluate the costs and benefits of some of these Universities activities. 
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Figure 4: Productivity Improvement in DNA synthesis 
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 Look at the CAMBIA – new info on  agrobacterium 
 




U.S. Patent Holder /Licensee  Remarks 




US 4,940,838 Mogen 
(Netherlands) now owned by 
Syngenta 
30% trans-









     & 
Monsanto  
Max Plant & Monsanto U.S. 





Turn off Agrobacterium   Washington U.  US 6,051,757 and US 
6,051,409 
 
Particle gun Helium 
Biorad  
Cornell US  4,945,050 
Cornell owns patent DuPont 




Particle gun electric 
discharge  
Agracetus   U.S. 5,015,580 Agracetus -






Silicon carbide fiber 
(or"whisker") 
Zeneca  US 5,302,523 Zeneca  Inefficient (<1% 
transformation) 
 









Co-integrated and binary vectors for Agrobacterium-mediated transformation 
Assembling and using co-
integrated vectors 
Monsanto  
Max Planck Institute 
United States (in 
interference), Europe,  
EP 131620 B1 
EP 131624 B1 
AU 559562 B2 
SU 1582990 A3 
Binary vectors and 
transformation of dicots 
with binary vectors 
AstraZeneca /Mogen 
(Syngenta) 
United States, Europe, and 
Japan (pending)  
US 4 940 838 
US 5 464 763 
EP 120516 B1 
Transformation of dicots and monocots 
Transformation of dicots 
with an Agrobacterium 
vector 
Washington University  United States 
(Additional US application in 
interference) 




Japan Tobacco  United States, Europe, 
Australia, Japan, and Canada 
(pending) 
US 5 591 616 
EP 604662 B1 
EP 672752 B1 
 
Widely used markers in transformation 
Herbicide resistance 
Phosphinothricin, (bar gene) Hoechst/AgrEvo 
(Aventis) 
United States, Europe,   US 5 767 371; 5 767 370; 5 668 
297; 5 650 310; 5 637 489; 5 077 
399; 5 276 268; 5 273 894 
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Antibiotic resistance 
Antibiotic resistance gene 
under control of plant 
promoter  
Monsanto  United States  US 6 174 724 B1 
Kanamycin resistance gene 
under control of CaMV 
35S or 19S promoter  
Monsanto   United States and Europe  US 5 034 322 
EP 131 623 B2 
 
Hygromycin resistance  Novartis (Syngenta)  Europe, United States,   EP 68740 B1,EP 135291 B1 
EP 186425 B1 
US 4 727 028, US 4 960 704 
US 5 668 298 
Widely used reporter gene in transformation 
gus gene (β-glucuronidase)   CAMBIA  United States and Great 
Britain  
US 5 268 463US 5 432 081 
US 5 599 670, GB 2197653 
Widely used promoter 
Monsanto  
 
United States, Europe, and 
Japan 
US patents 5 352 605, 5 530 196, 
and 5 858 742; 
EP 131 623 B2 (currently being 
opposed) 
JP 2645217 B2 
CaMV 35S promoter 
Rockefeller University  United States  US 5 110 732 
US 5 097 025 
 
Source:  Pardey et al. (2001). (Background paper of UNDP Human Development Report) 
Notes:  The information provided above is fairly detailed but not exhaustive. The listed patents and applications 
are  
considered to be key documents, and some of them contain fairly broad claims. Note that other patents and 
applications  
not listed here are also relevant to the different elements forming part of the Agrobacterium transformation 
technology,  
marker and reporter genes.  
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Table 3. Companies doing plant genomics research 
 




Affymetrix Pioneer    1997 
 
Corn 
ArQule Monsanto    $12  mil_royalties 1997 
 
Biosource technologies  Dow Agrosciences ?  1998 
 
Celera AgGen  Aventis  ?  1999 
 
Corn 
Curagen Pioneer    $20  million  1998 
 
Corn 
Diversa Novartis  $12.5  mil  1999 
 
Genetrace Monsanto    $17.2  mil  1998 
 
Global Agro(Salk Inst.)  Agrobiotech  Equity stake  1998 
 
Forages 
Human Genome Sciences  Pioneer   $16 million  1996 
 
Corn  
IBM Monsanto  1997 
 




Institute of Genomic Research 
(TIGR) 
National Corn 
Initiative - USDA 
1998 Corn 
Maxygen  Pioneer   $35-85 million  1999 
 
Corn 
Mendal Biotechnology  Monsanto/Savia  $30 mil  1997 Fruits, 
veg. Corn 
Millenium Pharmaceuticals  Monsanto  $218 mil  1997 
 
Myriad Genetics  Novartis  $33.50   1999 
 
Cereals 
Paradigm Genetics  Monsanto   $55 mil 
 
2000 
Source. GRAIN Genomics: Whole Genome, Total Control Seedling March 2000. 
http://www.grain.org/publications/mar00/mar003.htm 
Companies doing plant genomics research  
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